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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the determinants of expenses from 2007 to 2012 in the Portuguese funds industry. 
The main contribution is to consider mutual funds and real estate funds simultaneously, particularly 
the latter, generally created according to customer’s  needs, usually for tax reasons. The results confirm 
the specificity of mutual funds and real estate funds. In the first, expenses are higher on funds 
composed by shares, derivatives and a large number of assets. In the second, expenses are lower on 
closed-end funds. In this case, it seems that customers are willing to pay a small fee for tax reasons 
once their management does not require a special skill. We did not find an evident relationship between 
expenses and the fund net asset value for both categories of collective schemes. The same occurs 
between expenses and fund´s performance.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The role of expenses charged to the owner of mutual funds has been debated, as well as the 
analysis of the determinants received by management and related activities (including those 
from custody, supervision and audit). Expenses are one of the relevant elements to examine 
the performance of managers and are often seen as a determining factor for the presentation 
of poor performance by the mutual funds. However, there is no consensus on this topic. For 
example, Otten and Bams (2002), analyzing Germany, France Italy, the Netherlands and the 
UK, concluded that the mutual funds presented positive abnormal earnings in most examined 
countries, after taking expenses into account. Cesari and Panetta (2002) found similar results 
for the Italian market although with reduced statistical robustness. Wermers (2000) for the US 
market, concluded that the profitability of mutual funds was only higher than expected if the 
different fees paid by investors were not considered. These results confirm that fund managers 
are no more informed than other members of the market (Carhart (1997)), on one hand, and 
the customers´ s skills (Gruber (1996)), on the other hand.  
With regard to the determinants of expenses, Korkeamaki and Smythe (2004) studied the 
Finish market and considered, among other explanatory variables, the fund´s size, the fund´s 
category (equity funds, bond funds, balanced funds, etc) and the fund´s risk and profitability. 
One of the most relevant results of this research concerns the relationship between the fund´s 
age and expenses: controlling the risk and return of a fund, older ones charge higher expenses, 
which indicates agency problems. According to the results of Korpela and Puttonen (2006) 
and Gil-Bazo and Martinez (2004), when considering the Finish and Spanish markets it 
showed that banks charge higher expenses than independent mutual funds companies when 
distributing such security. They attribute the result to customer relationships, bank cross-
selling and convenience to fund selection by bank mutual fund customers. The variable size 
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has been studied as a determinant of the expenses of mutual funds. Several studies conducted 
for the US market (Luo (2002), Golec (2003), Dellva and Olson (1998), Latzko (1999) and 
LaPlante (2001)) showed economies of scale in the mutual funds’ expenses. Latzko (2003) 
concluded that economies of scale are observed especially in administrative costs, but not so 
much on management fees. Luo (2002), on the other hand, also studied the determinants of 
expenses and found a negative sign for the age and positive one for the variables related to 
risk and profitability. A similar result was obtained by Ferris and Chance (1987) for the age. 
Khorana et al (2009), considered a sample of mutual funds from 18 countries for the year 
2002, and concluded that the fees vary across funds: fees are lower for index funds, funds of 
funds and funds that require a higher minimum investment. They also conclude that the degree 
of investor protection is a decisive factor in the fees charged in different countries. However, 
although generalizations can be made, again it should be noted that the determinants of fees 
charged are far from being consensual. For example, Malhotra and McLeod (1997) found a 
positive relationship between fees charged in bond funds and the performance of the 
respective fund, and the reverse applies with regard to equity funds. 
The importance of studying the fees charged by investment funds is particularly relevant 
at a time when the performance of mutual funds has been low, if not negative, given the 
recessive behavior of the economy. This has occurred particularly in equity funds; in mutual 
funds that are based on sovereign bonds and private debt whose credit ratings dropped to 
investment grade; in money market funds, after significant declines on lending interbank rates; 
and in real estate funds as a result of adverse developments in housing market after years of 
strong growth. 
 The objective of this study is to identify and analyze the variables that influence 
expenses of the funds domiciled in Portugal. In the Portuguese case, the analysis requires a 
fine contextualization of the investment fund industry. It is divided by mutual funds and real 
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estate funds, and both present specific characteristics. In general, mutual funds are securities 
created by fund management companies owned by banks and sold at their branches by way of 
competing with other financial instruments. Real estate funds, by contrast, are more directed 
towards institutional investors and demanding individuals who, for  tax and/or financial 
planning reasons, resort to mutual fund companies, not rarely independent of the largest 
financial groups. 
The main contribution of this work lies in the pioneering analysis of expenses´ 
determinants mutual funds and real estate investment funds. The results confirm the specifics 
of mutual funds and real estate funds, in particular, both at the age of funds as the 
independence of fund companies. 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the sample, the determinants of 
expenses of the mutual funds and real estate funds and the methodology; Section 3 discusses 
the results; Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
 
2. Sample, the determinants of expenses and the methodology 
 
The database used in this study refers to mutual funds and real estate funds managed by 
Portuguese fund companies from 2007 to 2012. We use two balanced panels of 126 and 102 
mutual funds and real estate funds respectively, i.e. a sample of 756 and 612 observations.  
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The expenses are the sum of management fees, custody fees and auditing and supervisory 
fees divided by fund´s net asset value. While mutual fund´s expenses have increased since to 
2008, the real estate ones did not have a significant change.   
 
Table I – Descriptive analysis of Expenses 
Panel A- Mutual Funds 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Mean 1,52% 1,49% 1,50% 1,50% 1,54% 1,56% 
Median 1,53% 1,48% 1,52% 1,53% 1,54% 1,55% 
Maximum 3,77% 3,70% 3,70% 4,06% 3,21% 3,38% 
Minimum 0,39% 0,27% 0,24% 0,24% 0,25% 0,25% 
Stand. Dev. 0,62% 0,64% 0,62% 0,65% 0,63% 0,60% 
Nº OBS 126 126 126 126 126 126 
 
Panel B- Real Estate Funds 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Mean 0,85% 0,82% 0,82% 0,83% 0,83% 0,74% 
Median 0,66% 0,65% 0,64% 0,63% 0,62% 0,60% 
Maximum 4,38% 4,41% 4,40% 5,86% 5,86% 2,86% 
Minimum 0,01% 0,01% 0,01% 0,01% 0,07% 0,00% 
Stand. Dev. 0,59% 0,59% 0,59% 0,71% 0,70% 0,48% 
Nº OBS 102 102 102 102 102 102 
 
 
We do not consider that the determinants of expenses of the mutual funds and the real 
estate funds are the same. An analyses of the specificity of both financial instruments is 
required. Such is the case of the following variables: stock funds, funds of local securities, 
number of assets, derivatives and closed-end funds. If the former two variables are 
intrinsically related with a mutual fund, the same does not happen with closed-end funds. The 
closed-end funds are much more related with the real estate funds since the fiscal regime of 
such funds creates incentives to develop them as a “tailor made” financial product.  
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The determinants of fund´s expenses considered in this research are the following:  
(i) Turnover (TR) - This variable is a proxy for activism and it is expected to present a 
positive sign as a determinant of mutual fund and real estate expenses once the fund 
managers require a higher remuneration for their activism (see Dellva and Olson (1998), 
Lesseig et al (2002) and Korpela and Puttonen (2006). It results from the sum of the value 
acquisitions and sales of a fund during a year divided by the monthly average of its net 
asset value on the same period; 
(ii) Size (LN (NAV)) - It is expected to present a negative sign, revealing economies of scale 
(vd. Ferris and Chance (1991), Sevick and Tufano (1997) and Berkowitz and Kotowitz 
(2002)). However, we would like to highlight the results obtained, on the one hand, by 
Lesseig et al. (2002) that indicate the management fees are positively influenced by the 
value of the managed assets, and on the other hand, by Latzko (1999) and Gao and 
Livingston (2008) who found a non-monotonic relationship between the two variables 
since it does not detect the existence of economies of scale for larger funds. Size is 
measured by the logarithm of fund´s net asset value on the end of year; 
(iii) Sharpe-Ratio (SR) - This indicator is used as an independent variable for both types of 
funds, and it is expected to present a positive sign once the expenses should increase with 
a fund ´s higher performance.  SR is obtained considering the funds ´ annual profitability 
from 2006 to 2011; the annualized volatility for the years 2006-11 is obtained considering 
monthly data for two years; the one-year bunds´ s yield is the risk-free asset; 
(iv) Closed-end funds (CED) - this dummy variable will only be considered for real estate 
investment funds. It is expected that the coefficient sign of this variable is negative once 
the portfolio should present greater stability in comparison with open funds, requiring less 
activity and demand for information by managers. However, Martin et al. (2001) found 
mixed results whether the closed-end funds and the open funds manage local or 
international assets; 
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(v) Stocks ´ funds (SF) - this dummy variable will only be taken into consideration for the 
securities investment funds. It is expected that there is a positive association between a 
fund ´s expenses and a fund composed of stocks since this requires a greater market 
monitoring by managers (Latzko (2003) and Korkeami and Smythe (2004)); 
(vi) Number of assets (LN (NA)) – only is used as an independent variable in the case of 
mutual funds and refers to the number of financial instruments included in the fund´s 
portfolio. It is expected that the signal is positive given the higher costs associated with 
the diversification of a portfolio; 
(vii) Funds of Local Securities (FLS) – the cost of obtaining information of local securities is 
lower than for foreign financial instruments (see Dellva and Olson (1998)) and 
consequently it is expected a positive relationship between fund ´s expenses and a fund of 
local securities. This dummy variable is characterized by distinguishing funds that hold 
more than 50% of its value under management in local securities and is used only as a 
determinant of securities´ s expenses of mutual funds;; 
(viii) Derivatives (Deriv) –  given the sophestification of using derivatives (as instrument of 
hedging or speculation) a fund manager will ask higher fund ´s expenses (see Korkeami 
and Smythe (2004)). This dummy variable distinguishes funds that hold derivatives from 
those that do not have and will only used in mutual funds; 
(ix) Number of participants (LN (Part)) - a fund with few participants is less susceptible of 
obtaining economies of scale and consequently we expect that such fund requires higher 
expenses than a fund with a large number of participants.  In the Portuguese case, such is 
of relevant importance, once, for tax reasons, there are many real estate closed-end funds 
with a small number of participants;    
(x) Age (LN (Age)) – It is expected that a fund commercialized for more years has been 
subjected to an expenses´ reduction given the increasing of operating efficiency as a result 
of the learning curve (vd. Ferris and Chance (1987)). Several authors found a negative 
relationship between the two variables, namely Dellva and Olson (1998), Lesseig et al. 
(2002) and Luo (2002).  
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(xi) Independence (Indep) – a fund managed by a management fund company that belongs 
to a financial group should benefit of lower the marketing and administrative costs, as a 
result of economies of scale (vd. Frye (2001)): However, the funds company can exploit 
the relationship between client and the bank (consequence of the clients being “hostages” 
of the financial group), requiring higher fees. The relationship between fund´ expenses 
and independence in management is not completely evident.  
 In table II, panels A and B, we present the coefficient correlation between the 
independent and dependent variables. In general, the correlation coefficient between the 
independent variables and the dependent variables presented statistical significance. This 
conclusion extends to both types of funds under review.  
    
Table II – The Correlation coefficient between the independent and dependent variables. 
Panel A – Mutual Funds 
EF are fund ´s expenses. TR (turnover) is the total value of acquisitions and sales during a year divided by the average net asset value of 
the fund.SF is a dummy variable that assumes 1 for stocks ´ funds and 0 for the other ones. NAV is the fund ´ net asset value. NA is the 
number of assets managed by a mutual fund. FLS is a dummy variable that assumes 1 for a fund mostly composed (more than 50% of the 
portfolio) by local securities. Deriv is a dummy variable that assumes 1 when a mutual fund has derivatives in its portfolio. SR is the 
difference between annual return of a mutual fund and one-year bunds yield ´s divided by mutual fund ´s volatility. Part is the number of 
investors of a mutual fund. Age is the fund ´ s number of years since began trading. Indep is a dummy variable that assumes 1 when a fund 
is managed by a financial group.  
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Panel B –Real Estate Funds 
EF are fund ´s expenses. TR (turnover) is the total value of acquisitions and sales during a year divided by the average net asset value of 
the fund. CEF (closed-end fund) is a dummy variable that assumes 1 for a closed-end fund. NAV is the fund ´s net asset value. SR is the 
difference between annual return of a mutual fund and one-year bunds yield ´s divided by mutual fund ´s volatility. Part is the number of 
investors of a mutual fund. Age is the fund ´ s number of years since began trading. Indep is a dummy variable that assumes 1 when a fund 
is managed by a financial group.  
 
 
 
For the analysis of the expenses ´ determinants are used three alternative specifications: 
(i) a pooled OLS, (ii) a panel with year fixed effects and (iii) a panel with year random effects:  
(i) EFi,t = β1 +  β2Xi,t−1+⋯….+βnXi,t−1 + 𝓊i,t 
 
 
(ii) EFi,t = βi,t−1 +  β2Xi,t−1+⋯….+βnXi,t−1 + 𝓊i,t 
 
(iii) EFi,t = βi,t−1 +  β2Xi,t−1+⋯….+βn,Xi.t−1 + 𝓊i,t 
where 𝛽𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛽1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 and t = 1.….6 
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 Where Xi.t-1 represents the different independent variables (with one year lag) used 
for the estimation e 𝓊i.t e 𝜀𝑖.𝑡−1 random disturbances. 
 
    
3. Results 
 
In Table III, panels A and B, the results of the multivariate analysis are presented. In Table 
III, panels A and B, the results of the multivariate analysis are presented. In both cathegories 
of funds the same result is obtained: Pooled OLS is sufficient to analyze both situations, once 
the models with fixed effects and random effects add no statistical robustness (see redundant 
fixed effects tests, the LM tests and Hausman tests). 
The results of the three econometric approaches lead to similar conclusions, particularly 
in terms of the value and sign of the estimates. In mutual funds, the expenses are higher in 
stock funds, in mutual funds that includes derivatives and in mutual funds with a large number 
of different assets (see panel A). Korkeami and Smythe (2004) conclude the same for the two 
former variables. The demand for information, the greater sophistication of investments and 
a diversified portfolio of assets help to explain the impact of three variables in the expenses 
charged by mutual funds companies. On the contrary, mutual funds whose portfolios are 
primarily composed by local securities seem to require a lower remuneration, although 
without statistical significance. Dellva and Olson (1998) found identical results although with 
statistical significance. The analysis risk vs. return, measured by the Sharpe ratio, does not 
mean a higher compensation for mutual funds companies, as a result of its meritorious 
performance, on the contrarian (vd. Haslen et al. (2008)). There are also no obvious signs of 
economies of scale (measured by the NAV and the number of investors in mutual fund) in the 
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management of securities investment funds. In fact, if on the one hand, greater amounts under 
management are associated with higher mutual funds ' expenses (relationship without 
statistical significance), on the other hand, the relationship between the mutual funds´s and 
the number of participants is negative (also without statistical significance). 1 As regards the 
age of the funds, the results confirm that the expenses charged a mutual fund is negatively 
influenced by that variable. One explanation given in the finance literature points to the 
increase in operational efficiency as a result of the learning curve (vd. Ferris and Chance 
(1987)). Finally, the results indicate that mutual funds ´s expenses is lower in the case where 
the management of a mutual fund is in charge of an independent company of mutual funds. 
This result is consistent with the existence of low levels of information by investors and with 
the close links between a financial institution that owns a mutual fund company, and its 
customers. 
As the real estate investment funds is concerned, the mutual funds ´s expenses is lower in 
closed-end funds (Panel B). Such as for mutual fund, there are also some signs on the non-
existence of economies of scale in the management of real estate funds. However, contrary to 
that observed in mutual funds, the expenses of real estate investment funds increases with age, 
which may be related to the characteristics of the financial instrument. The majority of cases 
of real estate funds are made to the customer (taylor-made) and it is expected that those who 
were created more times, have higher fees and that the new real estate funds which arise in 
adverse economic environment and competitive, present lower expenses. Finally, the 
expenses of real estate funds is higher in the case of independent management companies. It 
is plausible that this happens because such companies have higher operating costs, in 
particular because they work in a more personalized environment, contrarily to real estate fund 
companies integrated on financial groups that manage mutual funds and real estate funds. 
                                                          
1 The exclusion of number of participants does not alter the conclusion drawn in the text. 
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Table III – Multivariate analysis on mutual funds 
Panel A – Mutual Funds   
EF are fund ´s expenses. TR (turnover) is the total value of acquisitions and sales during a year divided by the average net asset value of 
the fund.SF is a dummy variable that assumes 1 for stocks ´ funds and 0 for the other ones. NAV is the fund ´ net asset value. NA is the 
number of assets managed by a mutual fund. FLS is a dummy variable that assumes 1 for a fund mostly composed (more than 50% of the 
portfolio) by local securities. Deriv is a dummy variable that assumes 1 when a mutual fund has derivatives in its portfolio. SR is the 
difference between annual return of a mutual fund and one-year bunds yield ´s divided by mutual fund ´s volatility. Part is the number of 
investors of a mutual fund. Age is the fund ´ s number of years since began trading. Indep is a dummy variable that assumes 1 when a fund 
is managed by a financial group. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance. 
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Panel B –Real Estate Funds   
 
  
 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we analyze the determinants of mutual funds´s and real estate domiciled in 
Portugal. The determinants of expenses´ of real estate funds reflect the characteristics of the 
two categories of funds in Portugal. The mutual funds are sold massively and real estate are 
more targeted to a particular audience, and often tailored "to the customer." In this context, it 
is not expected that both categories of funds have the same determinants. 
For mutual funds, the expenses depend positively on having stocks, derivatives and the 
number of years since the constitution of the fund. The complexity of portfolio analysis with 
those financial instruments and concerns in terms of its diversification justify the existence of 
an additional cost to the participants of the mutual fund. On the other hand, the expenses of 
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mutual funds depends negatively on the age of the fund, which will be related to the increase 
of operational efficiency as a result of the learning curve. Finally, the results indicate that 
expenses are higher in cases where the management of a fund is in charge of an integrated 
company in a financial group. This result is consistent with the existence of low levels of 
information by investors, reduced distribution channels of independent management 
companies and close links between each financial institution and its customers.  
Concerning real estate funds the results show that funds´ expenses are higher for closed-
end funds and for funds managed by an independent company.  Finally, real estate funds show 
signs of the existence of economies of scale in its management, something that does not 
happen in mutual funds. But the fund performance is not linked to the level of commissioning, 
which is an indicator the existence of commissions (management) predominantly fixed and 
???? with the performance of the fund. 
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